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Posted by on Nov 23, 2017 in Civil, Right to Know | 0 comments

Miller v. County of Centre: District Attorneys are not “Judicial Agencies” exempt from Right to Know disclosure requirements

Right to Know (RTK) requests by several defense attorneys in Centre County (home of Mount Nittany) revealed communications between DA Stacy Parks Miller and judges on CCP and MDC, which the defense attorneys used to demonstrate ex parte communications in various cases. The County handed over all documents requested without consulting with Parks Miller or the judicial staffs. Parks Miller sued for an injunction prohibiting future disclosures on the basis that she is not subject to the general disclosure requirements of the Right to Know Law (RTKL) because she is part of a “judicial agency” as defined in the statute.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled in Miller v. County of Centre that DAs are not “judicial agencies” for purposes of the RTKL, and are subject to the general disclosure of requested documents unless they can show another valid privilege or exemption.

Majority by Wecht: Plain text of RTKL includes DAs in disclosure requirements

Justice Wecht, writing for the 5 members of the unanimous Court, says that an “examination of the RTKL, the definitional section of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 102, and the definitions provided in our Rules of Judicial Administration, demonstrate that a district attorney’s office is not a ‘judicial agency’ for purposes of the RTKL,” and thus, is subject to the general disclosure rules of the statute.

Determining how the DAs of Pennsylvania are classified is a crucial step in the fight over disclosure of their records. This is because there is a presumption that “All records in the possession of Commonwealth and local agencies are presumed to be public records subject to disclosure” unless a specific exemption, privilege or statute can be shown to exempt them. The common law right to access public documents that precedes Pennsylvania’s first RTK statute. The public policy of Pennsylvania strongly supports disclosure of government documents upon request of private parties.

However, this broad duty to disclose does not apply to “judicial agencies” under the RTKL. The DA’s argument “relies entirely upon the facially curious inclusion of district attorneys within the definition of ‘system and related personnel’ set forth in the Judicial Code and the Rules of Judicial Administration.” But a quick review of the Judicial Code and the RTKL reveals that DAs are defined as “related staff,” and not “personnel of the system.” Thus, they are not shielded as “judicial agencies” under the RTKL.

This reading is consistent with the objective of the RTKL, which “‘is to empower citizens by affording them access to information concerning the activities of their government,’ to promote openness to official government information in order to prohibit secrets, scrutinize the actions of public officials, and to make public officials accountable for their actions.” The RTKL and its predecessor, RTKA were designed to increase accountability for unelected agencies, and to ensure the public’s right to access information remains unfettered by red tape.

Concurrence by Donohue: We’re borrowing definitions from other statutes

Justice Donohue, joined by Justice Dougherty, concurs in the result that DAs are not judicial agencies, but chides the majority for borrowing too liberally from the judicial code in making its determination in the present case. The definitions of the respective statutes “are intended to apply only to the defined terms contained in those statutes and rules.”

Conclusion: So…about those ex parte communications…

Perhaps I’m just amped up from reading about judges being dismissed over ex parte communications, but I’m extremely curious to know more about the underlying facts in this case. The Court makes no comment on the scandalous allegations—and perhaps because they’re either pending as formal charges, or because the charges went nowhere already—but I can’t contain my own curiosity as to the nature of these communications and the results of them.

Our Supreme Court continues to chart a bold and broad reading of the RTK’s disclosure requirements—consistent, I believe, with the text and purpose of the RTKL. In PSP v. Grove, decided earlier this year, the Court did not shy away from making the State Police offer up their motor vehicle recordings in a broad ruling; now the Court makes clear that DAs are required to give up information upon request, as well.

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Posted by on Nov 23, 2017 in Civil, Insurance, Statutes of Limitations | 0 comments

Erie Ins. Exchange v. Bristol: SOL on UM claims begins to run at refusal to arbitrate

On July 22, 2005, Mr. Bristol was injured when he was struck in a hit and run accident within the scope of his employment in Upper Dublin Township (childhood home of Josh Singer, an Emmy-nominee and Oscar winner). Two years later, Bristol’s attorney put Erie on notice of the uninsured motorist (UM) claim, and Erie responded with a “reservation of rights” letter. Both parties agreed to several of the arbitrators and engaged in negotiation. Bristol had to put the matter on hold for a few years when he was incarcerated on unrelated matters. But negotiations stalled, and in May 2013, Erie filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that Bristol’s 4-year breach of contract statute of limitations (SOL) had run pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525.

This is an issue of first impression for SCOPA, although the Superior Court has a long line of precedents on the matter.

Majority by Mundy: Clock starts ticking on breach

Justice Mundy, speaking for the 6-1 majority, rules that a UM claim’s SOL begins to run at the date of the insurer’s breach, which could be at the date of the denial of coverage to the insured, or the date of some other breach of a contractual obligation, such as the date that the insurer refused to arbitrate. This ruling is based on the principle that it is “the accrual of the right of action that starts a limitations period to run.” This accords with the majority of jurisdictions.

There are essentially three ways to determine when the SOL for a UM claim begins to run: at the denial of coverage, as argued by Bristol, at the time the injured party knows the tortfeasor was uninsured (or underinsured), which is what Erie urged, or in a more absolute sense, at the date of the accident. The Court denies Erie’s argument that insurance contracts are different from other contracts subject to the general four-year SOL, and finds that Bristol had no need to file in court to preserve his claim until his contractual rights were denied—in this case, when Erie refused to move forward with arbitration on the basis that the SOL had run.

The majority attempts to quell the concerns of the insurance industry that there will now be no clear cut-off for UM claims by suggesting that cases of extraordinary delay may be solved by “equitable principles.” Usually, claimants will gain nothing by delay, and if they do stall unreasonably, the courts can bar their claims on other grounds.

Dissent: I’m fine with the ruling, but this argument was forfeited below

Justice Wecht may be the only dissenter, but he writes with enough fury for the whole Court. A little background: back in May, after oral argument, the Court re-phrased the grant of allocator, with the practical effect of expanding the issue it had originally granted for briefing and argument. It did so over Wecht’s vehement dissent (the Chief Justice’s explanation is here). Justice Wecht argued the matter had been forfeited by Bristol at both the trial court and the Superior Court, where Bristol’s only arguments were that he notified Erie of his intent to pursue a UM claim within the applicable four year time period, and in the alternative, that the four-year SOL was tolled by the filing for arbitration. In other words, he never suggested that the time period had not even begun to run, which was his argument before the Supreme Court.

“I refuse to endorse Bristol’s choose-your-own-adventure litigation strategy,” Wecht explains, arguing it is time “either by rule or by decision—to commit to clear standards for determining whether a particular case warrants departure from our ordinary issue preservation doctrines. Absent such standards, the unpreserved issues that the Court regularly declines to consider will continue to be indistinguishable from those that we idiosyncratically agree to resolve. In my view, such arbitrary and selective enforcement of our Rules of Appellate Procedure is ill-advised.”

Conclusion: Perhaps there’s a corresponding duty of good faith on the part of the insured

The Court’s opinion appears to be correct on the substance, as even the vehement dissent points out. Your SOL begins to run on a breach of contract when the contract has been breached. But unlike most contractual situations, the insured has no real obligations to the insurer after the date of the accident. His obligations are done. He paid his premiums, and the contract was valid on that date.

So how can an insurance company know that the insured is abandoning his UM claim, or is simply sitting on it? Can the insurance company force his hand in any way? Perhaps there is a corresponding duty of good faith and fair dealing owed by the insured to his insurance company that forces him to communicate if asked what he intends to do. Realistically, this opinion leaves the ball in the insured’s court to wait to file or move forward on a claim until he’s ready.

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Posted by on Nov 23, 2017 in Attorney Discipline, Civil, Constitutional Provisions | 0 comments

In re Roca, In re Segal: No, we can’t just ignore the Constitution

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is, perhaps, the most powerful state Supreme Court within its own jurisdiction. Given comprehensive power over all attorney discipline matters by the state Constitution, our Supreme Court has struck down validly-passed statutes that transgress this judicial power. Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court also maintains “King’s Bench” authority to step into any case at any time and render a decision on any matter, great or small, within a case. Other jurisdictions limit their high courts by practice or rule.

These cases call on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to determine whether the Commonwealth’s Constitution limits SCOPA’s power to re-consider the punishments handed down by the Court of Judicial Discipline (CJD), and whether its common law King’s Bench power gives the Court power to intervene where the Constitution says it cannot.

Three judges were caught up in various schemes involving phone calls to one another and receiving phone calls from government officials asking for special favors in various cases, including entering continuances, re-opening cases closed by default, and granting or denying motions. The calls were recorded by the FBI pursuant to criminal investigations and then turned over to the CJD.

One judge resigned amidst the scandal; the remaining judges were removed from the bench and barred from holding future judicial office. Judge Segal’s offenses seem to be much more serious, involving an ongoing and persistent pattern of ex parte phone calls, favors and other judicial misconduct. Judge Roca’s conduct was limited to one instance in which she requested a favor from another judge for a family member. Roca argued that her conduct did not warrant the harsh penalties imposed on her, and that the Court should moderate her punishment in consideration of the punishment imposed for past crimes.

These cases were argued together, but ruled on separately. I will focus on In re Roca because its legal argument is much more interesting, and because the ruling in In re Segal follows a fortiore.

Majority by CJ Saylor: King’s Bench power does not override the Constitution

Pennsylvania’s Chief Justice, speaking for the 4-3 majority, makes the final ruling on this judicial misconduct. The Chief Justice rejects the notion that the Court’s common law King’s Bench power allows it to step into a proceeding for which the Commonwealth’s Constitution strictly limits review. The Court is limited to reviewing the record to ensure the facts found were not erroneous and that the punishment inflicted is not unlawful. It is not the place of the Court to trample the prerogative of the people or override the Constitution.

Relying on the plain language of Article V, § 18(c)(2), the Court declares that its standard of review is limited to overturning a judgment which is clearly contrary to law. The Court may not second-guess the punishment prescribed by the CJD, nor may it replace CJD’s judgment with its own. The Court may not ignore the Constitution in favor of its common law King’s Bench power.

In response to the claim that the CJD exceeded its authority in removing the Judge, the Supreme Court rules, “The CJD has wide discretion to fashion the appropriate penalty once it finds a predicate violation.” The Court opens the door to the idea that a punishment could be so beyond the pale of appropriateness, but does not make clear what that punishment would be.

Finally, the Court rejects Roca’s claim that she should not face such a severe punishment because it is unfair to her. The primary purpose of Judicial Discipline is to maintain the public’s confidence in the judiciary and to repair the public’s perceptions where misbehavior has brought the courts into disrepute. Thus, Roca’s claims of a personal right to more merciful consideration fall against the public concern.

Segal’s situation is far more serious, and Segal’s arguments are not as well developed. The Court’s majority affirmed the convictions of both judges.

Dissent by Donohue

Justice Donohue dissents, appalled at the “breathtakingly narrow definition of our standard of review,” which is “patently violative of the United States Constitution,” argues that the Court should engage a much broader inquiry into the conviction, and consider these appeals like any other. She urges that the Court should ensure the equal administration of justice for every citizen—including disgraced former judges.

Conclusion

The Pennsylvania Constitution made the CJD an independent body capable of exercising its discretion in determining what to do with judges who had violated the public trust. SCOPA’s power to review these decisions is accordingly limited. This is one of the few places where our Supreme Court’s power is limited.

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Posted by on Oct 19, 2017 in Civil, Constitutional Provisions, Tax Law | 0 comments

Nextel v. Commonwealth: Uniformity Clause Bars Flat Cap for Taxes, but Statute is Severable

When paying corporate income tax in Pennsylvania, a corporation is permitted to carry over a net loss from the previous year to reduce the current tax year’s taxable income. However, the amount of deduction the corporation may receive—the amount of “net loss” it may carry over from the prior year—is capped at the greater of 12.5% of its current tax year income, or a flat cap of $3 million.

Nextel’s 2007 deduction from its 2006 net losses was capped at 12.5% of its 2007 income because this was greater than the $3 million flat fee cap. Nextel then brought a refund claim, and subsequently brought suit arguing that the $3 million cap that they did not use in tax year 2007 violated the Uniformity Clause in Pennsylvania Constitution, Article VIII, § 1, and—here’s where it gets tricky—that both caps on net loss deductions must be stricken because the statute was inseverable. Because the calculation they did not use was unconstitutional, the entire statute had to be stricken.

Majority by Todd: The flat cap on carryover funds violates the Uniformity Clause, but is severable from the rest of the statute

The Court agreed with the first, but not the second of Nextel’s arguments, and so Nextel wins, but really loses. Justice Todd’s majority opinion comprehensively considers the Uniformity Clause, discussing its background as a popularly-demanded addition to the “Reform Constitution” of 1874, a reaction to the abusive political power of railroads which allowed them to maneuver the General Assembly to exempt the railroads and their allies from taxes, and incrementally placing larger taxing burdens on the rest of the population to make up for the shortfall.

The Uniformity Clause, which comes into the modern 1968 Constitution unchanged, requires “substantial uniformity, which means as nearly uniform as practicable in view of the instrumentalities with which and subjects upon which tax laws operate.”

Todd wrote that Nextel’s “as-applied” argument against the flat cap is strong because of the numbers: 98.8% of all companies were exempt under the $3 million flat cap, while Nextel and a small handful of other corporate taxpayers were “required to shoulder the entire corporate net income tax burden” because of their greater income. In this respect, Nextel bears a larger burden of the corporate taxation burden in the Commonwealth than other companies. The Court found, therefore, that the tax statute “has created disparate tax obligations between these two classes of similarly situated taxpayers based solely on the value of the property involved.” This disparate treatment violates the Uniformity Clause, and the flat cap must be stricken.

 However, the Court did not agree that the statute was inseverable. Severability is the doctrine that determines when a statute may be left standing even without a portion of the statute stricken as unconstitutional. In other words, if a statute says you may not drive red, blue or green cars on the highway, and the Court finds that the prohibition of red cars is unconstitutional, must the whole statute be stricken, or are blue and green cars still prohibited?

Noting the general policy of Pennsylvania that all statutes are severable, codified by 1 Pa.C.S. § 1925, the Court explored two statutory exceptions to severability, which can both be phrased simply: where the legislature would not have passed the remaining statute in its remaining form, or where the statute simply doesn’t make sense without the stricken provision, the whole statute must fail.

Here, there was no reason to think the two legislative goals served by the corporate “net loss” taxation construct were completely defeated by striking one version of measure. Because the percentage cap was valid, and would likely have been passed by the legislature even if they had known the “flat cap” would be stricken down.

Concurrence by Baer: Nextel’s Challenge should be viewed as both Facial and As-Applied

 Justice Baer’s concurrence, joined by Justices Donohue and Wecht, argues that Nextel’s challenge should have been considered as both an “as-applied” challenge to the statute (which is how Nextel characterized the lawsuit), and a “facial” challenge to the validity of the statute (which Nextel disavowed). “[Nextel’s] challenge necessarily implicates the facial validity” of the statute, and the Court should have considered these implications in its majority opinion. “I write separately to clarify that, in my view, our holding declares the NLC unconstitutional on its face.”

Justice Baer appears to be correct that the majority opinion treats the statute as stricken as to all parties, not just Nextel.

Conclusion: Assorted Thoughts

A few scattered notes on this case.

First, the majority notes that Pennsylvania was the first state to include a uniform taxation requirement in its constitution. Thus, Pennsylvania’s continued grappling with this provision provides some guidance for other courts on this issue, and for other states considering adopting such a provision.

Second, although the reasons for the delay are not totally clear, this case is being adjudicated ten years after the tax year in question.

Third, the opinion doesn’t discuss Nextel’s standing, or the lack thereof. Nextel sued over a provision that didn’t apply to it in an attempt to strike down the provision that did apply. Another way of dealing with this case might have been to say that Nextel could not prove the whole statute was unconstitutional, and to decline to reach the merits of the issue of flat tax provisions. Alternatively, the Court may have considered that Nextel was burdened by the dichotomy, and that the lighter tax burden of other companies was harming Nextel directly. Regardless, this issue wasn’t discussed.

Finally, Nextel raises an interesting argument that the Court’s refusal to knock down the whole statute disincentivizes others to challenge tax statutes under the constitutional provision. This argument was rejected by the Court—obviously, they can’t just give you a better judgment than the law requires to “incentivize” lawsuits. But the argument offers a practical insight into a major hurdle to Uniformity Clause legislation—who wants to pay to bring these suits? Most individual taxpayers don’t stand to gain enough, and companies under the $3 million threshold certainly wouldn’t bring one. That leaves it to companies like Nextel or major casinos to take up the fight—and if they don’t think it benefits their bottom line, we may be stuck with unconstitutional taxes.

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Posted by on Oct 6, 2017 in Civil, Insurance | 0 comments

Burke v. Independence Blue Cross: Legislature intended autism treatment to be offered in schools

The Autism Coverage Law requires insurance companies to provide coverage for autism treatment under certain group plans. One coverage specifically included in the statute is “applied behavioral analysis” (“ABA”). However, the statute allows companies to maintain “general exclusions or limitations of a health insurance policy.” ABA is defined as:

the design, implementation and evaluation of environmental modifications, using behavioral stimuli and consequences, to produce socially significant improvement in human behavior or to prevent loss of attained skill or function, including the use of direct observation, measurement and functional analysis of the relations between environment and behavior.

Independence Blue Cross denied ABA coverage at Anthony Burke’s school, arguing that the policy’s general “place-of-services” exclusion permitted them to decline delivery of otherwise-covered services at a location other than the doctor (in this case, the school). But of course, ABA coverage is most obviously needed in a school setting. What autistic child needs “environmental modifications” at the doctor?

Burke’s father argued that this exclusion operated to exclude ABA services at the main place where they are truly needed for Anthony in contravention of the General Assembly’s legislative intent in passing the Autism Coverage Law in the first place.

Majority by Saylor: Autism Coverage Law is materially ambiguous

Chief Justice Thomas Saylor, speaking for the 4-1 majority, holds that the Autism Coverage Law is “materially ambiguous in relevant aspects.” The holding is discussed more in a moment, but the ambiguity allows the Court to conclude the statute was incomprehensible without looking behind the statute to legislative intent. Simply put, “the Legislature did not intend to permit exclusions that would eviscerate aspects of the coverage for autism treatment services that the Assembly has provided are mandatory.” Thus, our Supreme Court held “that the Legislature intended to permit only general exclusions that would not substantially undermine the mandatory coverage requirement.”

In other words, in passing a general rule that insurance providers must provide autism treatment, and by explicitly including ABA treatment in the statute, the legislature did not envision allowing insurers to escape this mandate by simply providing a general exclusion that ABA couldn’t be provided at the place it was primarily needed. “[W]e simply do not believe that the Legislature intended to permit insurers to exclude coverage in the sensory-laden educational environment where children spend large portions of their days, or to require families to litigate the issue of medical necessity discretely in individual cases to secure such location-specific coverage for the treatment.”

With this holding in mind, we return to the ambiguity justifying the Court’s foray into legislative intent: the Court held that the statute’s “catchall” provision was oddly worded, and appeared to be internally inconsistent. (“Coverage under this section shall be subject to copayment, deductible and coinsurance provisions and any other general exclusions or limitations of a health insurance policy or government program to the same extent as other medical services covered by the policy or program are subject to these provisions.”) The “any other exclusions” language appeared to the majority to be a reference to an entirely different style of exclusions than the foregoing language (the legal doctrine for this argument is ejusdem generis), and the statute’s apparent confusion led the Court to conclude it was irreconcilable without looking behind the statute to legislative intent. Thus, Anthony Burke’s ABA treatment must be covered by Independence Blue Cross at his school.

Dissent by Mundy: What ambiguity?

I rearrange the majority’s analysis above to end on the point which Justice Mundy dissents on. The statute, though perhaps oddly worded, appears to be fairly unambiguous. The legislature certainly could have “indicated that coverage for in-school services was mandatory, but it did not do so,” as the majority admits. Justice Mundy believes the statute is devoid of any confusion. The statute “plainly permits a health insurance provider to apply a general exclusion of its health insurance policy to limit the coverage mandated by” the Autism Coverage Law. Therefore, because “the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, there is no need to look beyond the plain meaning of the statute ‘under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.’” (quoting 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)).

Conclusion

This case really appears to be a situation where the majority reached behind the statute without any real ambiguity. I read the section on ejusdem generis several times, and I just can’t follow why the majority felt the statute was unclear. The phrase in question may have been strange, but it doesn’t appear to be ambiguous. Furthermore, while going behind the statute is discouraged absent the existence of an ambiguity, the Court still could have ruled that the statute was frustrated by the exclusion without finding an ambiguity.

Justice Mundy calls the Court on its analysis—and the majority admits some reticence in its ruling in its final footnote (admitting “reluctance to accord too much weight to the statute’s  allusions to [] coordination” with schools’ individual education plan supervisors over ABA treatment on the basis that the legislature could have made it clearer that such coverage is required to be offered in schools).

This case should probably prompt legislative action either way. Was this the legislature’s intent? The statute can be clarified if the legislature doesn’t agree with the ruling, and ultimately, that would be a good use of the Assembly’s time.

One final note on the vote count: Justices Todd and Wecht did not cast votes, and Justice Wecht did not participate in consideration of the case.

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Posted by on Sep 29, 2017 in Admissibility, Civil, Rules of Evidence | 0 comments

Coughlin v. Massaquoi: No per se Requirement for Corroborating Evidence before BAC is admissible in a civil case

When is blood alcohol content (BAC) admissible in a civil case to prove negligence (including contributory negligence)? In the context of a car accident, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has previously held that “the word drinking . . . carries the inevitable connotation of considerable drinking,” Harvey v. Doliner, 399 Pa. 356 (1960), and that courts must be careful to weigh the prejudice resulting from such connotations against the relevance of the evidence under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403. The Superior Court has taken this ruling to mean that BAC is only admissible in a civil negligence case where there is some other, independent evidence of intoxication as a threshold matter to support admissibility of the BAC.

On the night of January 13, 2012, Ummu Massaquoi was traveling southbound on Castor Avenue in northeast Philadelphia (home of the short-lived Liberty County Secessionist Movement) struck Thomas Coughlin, a pedestrian that Massaquoi did not see in an intersection and killed him. The autopsy revealed that Coughlin had a BAC of .313 (for comparison’s sake, with a BAC of .08, it is illegal to drive) and trace amounts of illegal substances in his system. There were no other witnesses to the accident, and no other evidence regarding Coughlin’s drinking or other actions that night.

Coughlin’s estate moved to preclude the admission of BAC on the idea that the introduction of this evidence would prejudice the jury against Coughlin. The trial court denied the motion, and Massaquoi was permitted to put on expert testimony about the effect that a BAC of .313 would have on coordination and judgment. The jury found Massaquoi negligent, but found that her negligence was not the proximate cause of Coughlin’s death.

Majority by Todd: BAC and expert testimony are relevant to contributory negligence of the plaintiff

Justice Debra Todd, writing for the majority, ruled that the admissibility of BAC in a civil case is analyzed just like any other piece of evidence. Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 402 asks if the evidence is relevant. If it is, then it is analyzed under rule 403: does its relevance outweigh any potential prejudice to the party against whom it is offered?

Considering this two-part analysis, the majority has no trouble ruling that a pedestrian’s blood alcohol level is directly relevant to whether he may have played a part in the negligence that brought about his death. But the word “drinking” carries a high risk of prejudice, as the Supreme Court held in Harvey, and so a trial court should only admit evidence of intoxication if it reasonably shows intoxication.

While recognizing that the mere introduction of BAC at a trial has the potential to confuse the jury, the Supreme Court rejected the standard of the Superior Court in requiring evidence from another source before admitting BAC. Rather, “the admissibility of BAC evidence is within the trial court’s discretion based upon general rules governing the admissibility of evidence and the court’s related assessment of whether the evidence establishes the pedestrian’s unfitness to cross the street.”

This latter term—the pedestrian’s unfitness to cross the street—is emphasized in the majority opinion. The Court uses this term as a sort of stand-in for the term “relevance.” In other words, proof of drinking, or proof that the pedestrian was a drunk, is prejudicial. Proof that his consumption of alcohol that evening may have made him stagger out into the street negligently is relevant. Where, as in the present case, an expert witness was offered to the jury to explain the effects of alcohol upon the pedestrian’s unfitness to cross the street, the Court found “the probative value of such evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.”

Concurrence by Donohue: The Majority Opinion should be read in light of the facts

Justice Christine Donohue concurs, writing however that the Court’s opinion “is not tethered to any discussion of the facts of this case,” and that the opinion should not be read broadly. Only where the facts support a finding of intoxication—and not merely where one could speculate from BAC as to the pedestrian’s intoxication—should the trial court admit the evidence.

Dissent by Mundy: Other Evidence of Intoxication Should be Required

Justice Sally Mundy briefly dissents, arguing that independent evidence of intoxication—an eyewitness who saw the pedestrian staggering, “or other evidence of his behavior or demeanor,” should be required before the admission of evidence as to intoxication. Admitting BAC level without solid evidence about what happened “in a poorly lit area at night” only “invites speculation on the part of the jury.”

Conclusion: BAC is just like everything else

The simplest takeaway from this case is that BAC evidence is just like any other kind of evidence in a civil negligence case. It can be admitted if it clears the hurdles of 402 and 403. Although the Court doesn’t explicitly say so here, where the BAC is high, it is more likely to be relevant. Where evidence exists to actual drunkenness, or where evidence shows the party’s response times were slowed, admission of BAC is a virtual lock. And where there is no corroborating evidence, the party seeking admission is not without hope.

The odd part of the majority’s opinion is called out in both the concurrence and the dissent (see footnote 3 of Mundy’s dissent, for example). The majority relies on the expert’s opinion to bolster their conclusion. But why should a jury be less confused just because an expert testified? The underlying evidence challenged was the basis for the expert’s testimony.

Regardless, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s ruling in Coughlin v. Massaquoi clearly puts BAC evidence on part with other types of evidence, and its admissibility rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.

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