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Posted by on Nov 16, 2017 in Criminal, Expert Testimony, Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence | 0 comments

Com v. Maconeghy, Jr.: Medical testimony based on nothing but another witness’s testimony is not all right, all right, all right

In a criminal prosecution about sexual assault of a child, a medical doctor opined, “The history [the child] provided to me pretty clearly indicated that she was sexually abused.” The doctor concluded with this classic statement of scientific certainty: “I really believe strongly that was my medical conclusion that this child was victimized.” Can a doctor testify to a medical opinion based entirely on the “history” provided by the alleged victim?

Our Supreme Court rules that the doctor cannot offer such testimony because such testimony invades the province of the jury.

Majority by CJ Saylor: Testimony of a sexual assault victim cannot be cloaked in medical authority by an expert witness

Chief Justice Saylor writes for the majority, explaining that a medical expert may base his conclusion on the testimony of the sexual assault victim, and may even relay that testimony to the jury, but only if the medical expert’s testimony is based on something, well, medical. To hold otherwise would put “a certificate of veracity on the child’s testimony” and offer the jury “a much sought-after hook on which to hang its hat.”

The central focus of the Court’s inquiry is to the “province of the jury” analysis. The Court is concerned that the jury’s role as trier of the credibility of the witnesses is not usurped by a confident, educated witness willing to assure the jury that he has already weighed the victim’s statement in his well-trained mind and come to a conclusion.

The Court notes that this holding is the majority of jurisdictions: most states and federal courts will not allow a medical expert to testify solely on what he was told by the victim. SCOPA, having taken one of the more restrictive approaches in restricting an expert’s testimony as to general characteristics of sexual assault victims, can’t “now forge a minority pathway on the opposite side of the spectrum by sanctioning the admission of evidence having a more direct bolstering effect specific to the complainant.”

“Upon our review, we hold that an expert witness may not express an opinion that a particular complainant was a victim of sexual assault based upon witness accounts couched as a history, at least in the absence of physical evidence of abuse.”

Dissent by Todd: There’s a difference between expert testimony on the subject of witness credibility and expert testimony on subjects which are merely founded on assessments of witness credibility

Justice Todd argues that the Court is actually departing from its prior caselaw, including several cases where she believes the matter had already been decided adversely, albeit in dicta. Quoting extensively from the trial transcript, Todd argues that the medical expert’s testimony was not, “The victim’s testimony is credible,” but rather, something more along the lines of “I’ve considered several things, one of which is the victim’s testimony, and come to a conclusion.”     

Dissent by Mundy: The objection was forfeited, and was invited error

There are a number of odd things about the objections in this case at the trial court. Justice Mundy takes on the elephant in the room: by the majority’s description of the case, it sounds as though trial counsel forfeited his objection by failing to raise it for almost a day at trial. Indeed, the trial court transcript reveals that the judge was not sure of the exact wording of the witness in order to rule on defense counsel’s objection.

In addition, some of the testimony was actually invited by defense counsel on cross-examination. Mundy points out that the expert testimony had to be disclosed in discovery, and that defense counsel could not claim to have been caught by surprise in the case. He was aware of the coming testimony, but failed to be prepared to timely object. Mundy sums up her frustration: “Despite defense counsel’s failure to timely object during his own questioning of the witness, Appellee is now rewarded with a new trial.”

Conclusion: No one likes child molesters, but this seems like the right decision

No one likes defendants like this, so it’s easy to look the other way when an apparent abuse of procedure helps put the guy away. But the majority appears to be right: we don’t need an expert medical witness to declare another witness credible. Doctors can testify to medical matters, but what business do they have basing their “expert medical opinion” gained by their years of experience in medicine to tell a jury that the kid seems credible?

The highest role a court can play is in creating a fair trial for an evil man. In this respect, this type of opinion represents the best of American law. Even the wicked deserve a fair hearing, and if the victim is credible, the jury will be able to tell.

But Justice Mundy’s dissent points up a problem in this case. The objections just don’t seem to have been timely. The Superior Court found they were, and the majority doesn’t even discuss this point. Perhaps there was a reason the Court was satisfied about timeliness, but it is not apparent to the reader of the case.

Regardless, this opinion is important. It will be dispositive in the sexual assault context, will have an impact on expert witnesses well outside the criminal context, and will be cited in briefs on expert witness testimony for years to come.

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Posted by on Sep 29, 2017 in Frye Test, Murder, Suppression | 0 comments

Com v. Jacoby: Capital Appeal: Introduction of unconstitutionally seized murder weapon evidence was harmless error

The opening paragraph of this case read like an Alfred Hitchcock screenplay. The police

received a call that originated from Monica Schmeyer’s residence . . . When the police arrived, they found Monica Schmeyer dead on her living room flolr. Blood droplets and stains surrounded her body. The telephone was off the hook; there was blood on the 9 and the 1. There was also a .32 caliber Speer branded shell casing on the floor near Monica Schmeyer’s body.

In Commonwealth v. Jacoby, a direct capital appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rules that the introduction of an unconstitutionally-seized barrel of the murder weapon, which was urged to the jury during closing argument, was “harmless error.” In addition, Jacoby was not entitled to a Frye hearing when his argument was about the novel application of non-novel scientific evidence. For these reasons, among others, Jacoby’s conviction was confirmed.

Timothy Jacoby, the Defendant, was part of an informal group of friends that regularly met at a local Hooters. The group dubbed themselves the “Orange Shorts Society” for the garb worn by waitresses at the restaurant, and gathered together for recreational purposes. During these “meetings,” Dr. Jon Schmeyer, one of the “members,” frequently offered life updates regarding his divorce, his ex-wife, the alimony he paid her, and his ex-wife’s curious habit of keeping the sums paid to her in envelopes squirreled away around the house. In addition, this Dr. Schmeyer mentioned casually that the couple’s daughter would be out of the country for a certain period of time.

As a subsequent meeting of the Orange Shorts Society, on the afternoon and evening of March 31, 2010, Jacoby was not present despite the expectation of the other members, including Jacoby’s fiancée, that he would attend. The murder at Schmeyer’s home took place during this meeting. Two witnesses would later testify to seeing a man matching Jacoby’s general description in the area during this time. One of the witnesses remembered the man was carrying a white envelope. The other witness remembered hailing the man walking by his home, and that the man only nodded and then looked down. (Personally, I don’t find this fact to be that odd—this is Pennsylvania, after all). Finally, surveillance video captured a work van from Jacoby’s employer in the area near the time of the murder despite the fact this his employer does not do work in that area. In addition, the “sign out sheet” for the work vans was missing for the month in question (highly unusual according to the supervisor), and Jacoby put in an expense reimbursement for the time period in question. In addition, DNA evidence collected at the scene did not exclude Jacoby or his male relatives.

But most damningly of all, the police learned that Jacoby—a convicted felon—owned a .32 caliber pistol that matched the shell casing found at the scene. 15 months after the crime, police obtained a search warrant for Jacoby’s home and found a barrel that matched the pistol, although they did not find the pistol. Jacoby was convicted by a jury and sentenced to death due to the aggravating factor of the commission of a felony while committing the murder (in this case, burglary and robbery).

Wecht for the Majority: Murder Weapon

Writing for a majority of the Court (but you’ll have to do some matching up with section numbers to determine how many are in the majority for each section), Justice David Wecht finds no error in the majority of the trial. As with all capital appeals, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is tasked with microscopically re-examining every aspect of the trial, and the vast majority of the time, there is no error. However, three holdings stand out, the most important of which are the first and third, below.

First, and most importantly, despite finding that the warrant issued for Jacoby’s home was invalid, and that the barrel of the murder weapon found there should have been suppressed, the Court rules that the error was harmless. The affidavit submitted in support of the request for the warrant stated that Jacoby had previously had a registered firearm, that he was now a convicted felon, and that “it is reasonable to believe Jacoby would retain this item as he is barred from legally obtaining another hand-gun.” The Court found this central allegation in support of the warrant application to be “conjecture and speculation, particularly considering the gap in time,” and ruled that there was no probable cause for a warrant under the Fourth Amendment or Article I, § 8. “[T]he general rule is that probable cause must be predicated upon individualized suspicion,” so where a warrant’s allegation about what it is “reasonable to believe” “is not tailored or individualized” to the Defendant “in any fashion,” the warrant “falls short of probable cause.” The Court came back to emphasize, several times, the long gap in time between when it was known that Jacoby owned a gun matching the description involved, and when they finally requested, obtained and executed a search warrant.

While finding the warrant requirement was not satisfied under either Constitution, the Court emphasized the heightened particularity required of a warrant under Article I, § 8. (“We also note that there is a strict particularity requirement” in § 8, and that “a warrant must describe the items as specifically as is reasonably possible.” (quoting Com v. Grossman, 521 Pa. 290 (1989)).

Despite finding that the barrel should have been suppressed, the Court rules that the error of introducing it was harmless. The barrel played, “at best, only a minimal part in the Commonwealth’s ballistics evidence and its overall evidentiary presentation,” and the existence of biological evidence, evidence that the bullet that killed the victim was “proven definitively to have been fired from a gun that also was fired” on a shooting range on Jacoby’s parents’ private property, and other circumstantial evidence rendered the admission of evidence of the barrel harmless error.

Second, the Supreme Court held “there are limits to automatic standing,” and that Jacoby lacked any standing to challenge a search of his parents’ home. Although Jacoby was charged with a possessory offense (Felon in Possession of a Firearm—a newer Desert Eagle was found in his parents’ possession, titled to Defendant), he did not benefit from automatic standing under the time differential doctrine of Com v. Peterkin 511 Pa. 299 (1986). Peterkin requires focus on “whether the defendant is charged with possessing” the contraband “at the time of the contested search and seizure.” Here, Jacoby’s possessory crime took place on the date of the murder, according to the Commonwealth, and the search happened some time later. Thus, Jacoby lacked standing to challenge the search of his parents’ home.

Finally, the Court ruled that Jacoby did not meet the threshold showing required to force a Frye hearing on the DNA evidence presented. Frye hearings are required where “novel scientific evidence” is to be presented. In contrast to the Federal Courts’ Daubert rules, Pennsylvania maintains the older Frye standard which precludes the admission of scientific testimony based on methods that are not yet well established in their respective scientific discipline.

Here, Jacoby argued against the expert’s conclusions were a novel application of well-established scientific tests—that is, that the tests and findings themselves were not the result of novel science, but only the expert’s findings based on those tests. He believed that the expert had placed too much weight on one type of DNA, rather than looking at a full battery of DNA tests.

Reviewing this point under an abuse of discretion standard, the Court declined to find any wrongdoing on the part of the trial court. Jacoby’s argument went to the weight of the evidence. He could always argue the weight of the evidence to the jury—which he in fact did.

Concurrence by Mundy: I would find probable cause for search of Defendant’s home

Justice Mundy concurs in the result, joined by Justice Baer. Mundy argues there was probable cause to search Jacoby’s home in this case. Citing Federal Court of Appeals caselaw for the proposition that judges should be permitted to infer that “suspects keep instrumentalities of crime in their own residences.” Arguing that guns are “durable and sometimes valuable objects” that are kept long term, Mundy finds no reason to believe that the passage of time made it less likely the police would find the gun at Jacoby’s home in this case.

Dissent by CJ Saylor: This error was not harmless

Chief Justice Saylor dissents, arguing that the verdict should be overturned and the case remanded for a new trial due to both the invalid search of Defendant’s home, and because the Defendant was entitled to a Frye hearing (Justice Donohue joins the Chief Justice’s dissent on this latter point). On the first point, the Chief Justice says, “I have difficulty with [the majority’s] application of the harmless error standard” because the Commonwealth did not advance this argument—and bears the responsibility to prove harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt—and because the majority did not assess the facts in favor of the Defendant in its analysis. Saylor criticizes the majority’s omission of major problems with the witnesses’ testimony, developed on cross examination, as well as evidence that Jacoby frequently missed Orange Shorts Society meetings. These facts make the harmless error ruling untenable in Saylor’s view.

Furthermore, arguing that the Frye standard may bar the evidence of DNA presented against Jacoby, Pennsylvania’s Chief Justice offers “an efficient use of limited judicial resources” adopted in other jurisdictions, such as California, Flordia and Maryland: where a Frye hearing should have occurred, the case should be remanded for purposes of that hearing only, and if the evidence is ruled admissible, the original jury verdict may stand. Only if the evidence is determined by the trial court to be inadmissible must a new trial be granted.

Conclusion: Important holdings where you least expect them

I don’t normally invest much analysis into these cases simply because they are usually garbage appeals. The Defendant’s attorney has to appeal to the Court, the Court has to take it, and both sides have to present a thorough re-airing of the entire trial. This serves an important constitutional function, but rarely yields interesting legal holdings.

This case is certainly an exception to that rule. Justice Wecht’s well-written opinion makes it enjoyable to read, for one thing, but more to the point, the three holdings discussed above will provide ammunition in future cases. The Court’s re-affirmance of the specificity requirements for a warrant under Article I of the Commonwealth’s Constitution should be carefully examined by defense attorneys, while District Attorneys across the state will benefit from the re-affirmation and discussion of the limits on automatic standing in possessory offenses. In short, this case was much more than the typical throw-away, and is worth the read (or skim) for attorneys in criminal practice.

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