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Posted by on Nov 16, 2017 in Criminal, Expert Testimony, Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence | 0 comments

Com v. Maconeghy, Jr.: Medical testimony based on nothing but another witness’s testimony is not all right, all right, all right

In a criminal prosecution about sexual assault of a child, a medical doctor opined, “The history [the child] provided to me pretty clearly indicated that she was sexually abused.” The doctor concluded with this classic statement of scientific certainty: “I really believe strongly that was my medical conclusion that this child was victimized.” Can a doctor testify to a medical opinion based entirely on the “history” provided by the alleged victim?

Our Supreme Court rules that the doctor cannot offer such testimony because such testimony invades the province of the jury.

Majority by CJ Saylor: Testimony of a sexual assault victim cannot be cloaked in medical authority by an expert witness

Chief Justice Saylor writes for the majority, explaining that a medical expert may base his conclusion on the testimony of the sexual assault victim, and may even relay that testimony to the jury, but only if the medical expert’s testimony is based on something, well, medical. To hold otherwise would put “a certificate of veracity on the child’s testimony” and offer the jury “a much sought-after hook on which to hang its hat.”

The central focus of the Court’s inquiry is to the “province of the jury” analysis. The Court is concerned that the jury’s role as trier of the credibility of the witnesses is not usurped by a confident, educated witness willing to assure the jury that he has already weighed the victim’s statement in his well-trained mind and come to a conclusion.

The Court notes that this holding is the majority of jurisdictions: most states and federal courts will not allow a medical expert to testify solely on what he was told by the victim. SCOPA, having taken one of the more restrictive approaches in restricting an expert’s testimony as to general characteristics of sexual assault victims, can’t “now forge a minority pathway on the opposite side of the spectrum by sanctioning the admission of evidence having a more direct bolstering effect specific to the complainant.”

“Upon our review, we hold that an expert witness may not express an opinion that a particular complainant was a victim of sexual assault based upon witness accounts couched as a history, at least in the absence of physical evidence of abuse.”

Dissent by Todd: There’s a difference between expert testimony on the subject of witness credibility and expert testimony on subjects which are merely founded on assessments of witness credibility

Justice Todd argues that the Court is actually departing from its prior caselaw, including several cases where she believes the matter had already been decided adversely, albeit in dicta. Quoting extensively from the trial transcript, Todd argues that the medical expert’s testimony was not, “The victim’s testimony is credible,” but rather, something more along the lines of “I’ve considered several things, one of which is the victim’s testimony, and come to a conclusion.”     

Dissent by Mundy: The objection was forfeited, and was invited error

There are a number of odd things about the objections in this case at the trial court. Justice Mundy takes on the elephant in the room: by the majority’s description of the case, it sounds as though trial counsel forfeited his objection by failing to raise it for almost a day at trial. Indeed, the trial court transcript reveals that the judge was not sure of the exact wording of the witness in order to rule on defense counsel’s objection.

In addition, some of the testimony was actually invited by defense counsel on cross-examination. Mundy points out that the expert testimony had to be disclosed in discovery, and that defense counsel could not claim to have been caught by surprise in the case. He was aware of the coming testimony, but failed to be prepared to timely object. Mundy sums up her frustration: “Despite defense counsel’s failure to timely object during his own questioning of the witness, Appellee is now rewarded with a new trial.”

Conclusion: No one likes child molesters, but this seems like the right decision

No one likes defendants like this, so it’s easy to look the other way when an apparent abuse of procedure helps put the guy away. But the majority appears to be right: we don’t need an expert medical witness to declare another witness credible. Doctors can testify to medical matters, but what business do they have basing their “expert medical opinion” gained by their years of experience in medicine to tell a jury that the kid seems credible?

The highest role a court can play is in creating a fair trial for an evil man. In this respect, this type of opinion represents the best of American law. Even the wicked deserve a fair hearing, and if the victim is credible, the jury will be able to tell.

But Justice Mundy’s dissent points up a problem in this case. The objections just don’t seem to have been timely. The Superior Court found they were, and the majority doesn’t even discuss this point. Perhaps there was a reason the Court was satisfied about timeliness, but it is not apparent to the reader of the case.

Regardless, this opinion is important. It will be dispositive in the sexual assault context, will have an impact on expert witnesses well outside the criminal context, and will be cited in briefs on expert witness testimony for years to come.

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